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In recent weeks, the economic direction of Egypt’s interim government has 
been the object of intense debate. International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development have already started to publicize economic 
prescriptions that amount to little more than the acceleration of the Mubarak-era 
neoliberal program. 
Promises of aid from the G8 have been pushing in the same direction—inevitably 
accompanied by the rhetoric of the need for ‘democratization’. The Gulf Arab 
states, in particular Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, have also pledged billions of 
dollars in loans and investment to the military-led Egyptian government.
The press releases accompanying many of these recent announcements of 
financial support speak grandly of “the transition to democracy and freedom”, 
conveniently ignoring, of course, the long-standing support given by Western 
regimes to Mubarak and other autocratic rulers in the region. However, analysis 
needs to move beyond simply highlighting such hypocrisy to be useful.
The plethora of aid and investment initiatives now being promised by global and 
regional financial institutions and by leading Western powers is designed, in fact, 
to consolidate and reinforce the power of Egypt’s dominant class in the face of 
ongoing popular mobilisations (see Hanieh 2011a). 
Ostensibly, this external assistance is meant to promote such laudable measures 
as ‘employment creation’ and ‘infrastructure expansion’ but such measures 
are premised, in reality, upon the classic adjustment policies of privatisation, 
deregulation and greater openness to foreign investment and trade. 
The Democracy Discourse
This is a new form of the so-called ‘Post-Washington Consensus’, in which a 
democracy discourse is now advertised as the basis to advance the neoliberal 
economic trajectory already initiated by the Mubarak era. The ultimate outcome 
is likely to be an Egyptian state that assumes some of the formal trappings of a 
liberal democracy but remains ultimately dominated by the country’s military 
and business elites.
The basic premise of the recent calls for accelerating economic reforms is that 
Egypt’s problems stem from the weakness of the private sector combined with 
the ‘rent-seeking’ of state officials. This view flows from long-standing analyses by 
IFIs of the alleged sources of Egypt’s economic problems. 
An example is the flagship World Bank report in 2009, From Privilege to 
Competition: Unlocking Private-Led Growth in the Middle East and North Africa, in 
which it prescribed the essential economic steps to be taken by all governments 
in the region: “(1) opening protected sectors such as retail and real estate, which 
have barriers to foreign investors…; (2) reducing tariff bands and nontariff 
barriers; (3) removing protection of state-owned firms…; and (4) eliminating 
anti-export biases.”
Since the disastrous decades of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the World Bank has been obliged to complement such an economic agenda with 
liberal-sounding institutional reforms. Thus, it has been able to readily adopt 
the slogans of the ‘Arab Spring’ that call for greater democracy and reforms in 
governance. 
Anti-Democractic Reforms
Since authoritarian regimes have been the norm in the Middle East, such calls 
for governance reforms can be easily portrayed as democratic. In fact, however, 
they are profoundly anti-democratic since they are designed to tailor public 
institutions to the needs of the private sector and remove the ability of the state 
to intervene, for the public good, in markets—where powerful economic elites 
continue to hold unquestioned sway.
From the early days of Egypt’s uprising, the political slogans heard on the 
streets involved demands such as reclaiming wealth that was stolen from the 
people, strengthening state support and services to the poor, renationalizing 
the industries that had been privatised and placing restrictions on foreign 
investment. But these demands have been largely ignored within the analytical 
framework of the IFIs, which have instead attempted to claim that the ‘Arab 
Spring’ occurred in response to the absence of capitalism instead of its normal 
functioning. 
The remarks of Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, at the opening of 
a meeting on the Middle East in mid April are indicative of the logic of such an 
economic paradigm. Referring to Mohammed Bouazizi, the young peddler who 
became the catalyst for the Tunisian uprising by setting himself on fire, Zoellick 
remarked that “the late Mr. Bouazizi was basically driven to burn himself alive 
because he was harassed with red tape…” 
Precisely because Egypt’s uprising has been motivated by the belief that political 
and economic demands are inseparable and intertwined, Zoellick’s opportunistic 
‘pro-market’ recasting of its ideals is designed chiefly to deflect ongoing 
mobilisations from fulfilling their basic aspirations (see Hanieh 2011b). 
Debt Servicing and Odious Debt
The external financing of the acceleration of neoliberal economic reforms in 
Egypt is likely to assume two major forms: 1) the extension of loans that deepen 
the country’s external debt burden and 2) the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises through the vehicle of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).
At the end of 2010, Egypt’s total external debt was about US$ 35 billion (see 
Figure on next page). And for the last decade the country has been paying 
roughly $3 billion a year in debt service. Despite such yearly payments, the 
country’s total debt still increased by around 15%. 
More tellingly, during this same period Egypt’s net transfers on its long-term debt 
(its repayments minus new loans) totalled $3.4 billion. Hence, contrary to popular 
assumptions, more money has been flowing out of Egypt to Western lenders than 
vice versa. In other words, wealth has been continuously extracted from Egypt, 
effectively in order to enrich powerful financial institutions in the US and Europe.
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About 85% of this external debt had been public or publically guaranteed by 
the Mubarak regime. Moreover, the Egyptian ruling elite that was centred upon 
Mubarak and his closest coterie had profited handsomely from these loans. In 
this sense, much of this external debt could be characterised as ‘odious debt’, i.e., 
incurred by a dictatorial regime with blatant disregard for the common good.
In a major speech on May 19th, President Obama made a seemingly beneficent 
promise to relieve Egypt of up to $1 billion in its debt obligations to the US. 
However, this ‘forgiveness’ is tied, in fact, to a strict condition, namely, that the 
money freed up should be used in a manner approved by the US government. 
As the speech stated, the basic objectives should be “ensuring financial stability, 
promoting reforms and integrating competitive markets with each other and the 
global economy”.
At roughly the same time, the World Bank and IMF announced an agreement 
to provide Egypt with new loans totalling up to $6 billion, which World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick explicitly tied to “governance and openness reforms’” 
and to help finance Public-Private Partnerships, a modern euphemism for 
privatisation. A public debate ensued around the possible conditionalities of 
these proposed loans but the interim government refused to reveal any details.
 
In the context of this debate, and under pressure from Egyptian activists, the 
Finance Ministry announced on June 24 that, “for the time being”, it would no 
longer need assistance from the World Bank and IMF. However, the decision to 
temporarily reject the loans took place after the Egyptian government (with IMF 
advice) had revised the state budget to slash expenditure by around $4.6 billion.
 
Indicatively, the Finance Ministry has not made the full nature of the cuts 
public, except to disclose that they include a 50% reduction in spending on 
unemployment aid and a lowering of energy subsidies. Although the situation is 
in flux, it is clear that there is no retreat from neoliberalism. Overall indebtedness 
is still set to increase as Egypt takes on loans from other sources such as the Gulf 
states, bilateral lenders and the EBRD.
Public-Private Partnerships
In President Obama’s May 19th speech, he also pledged $1 billion in new 
investment in Egypt through the vehicle of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC). The mission of OPIC is to support US business investment in 
so-called emerging markets. Such support takes the form of reducing barriers to 
foreign capital and accelerating the privatisation of state-owned enterprise.
Soon after Obama’s speech, OPIC put out a press release announcing, for 
example, that the $1 billion of US investment would be used “to identify Egyptian 
government-owned enterprises investing in public-private partnerships in order 
to promote growth in mutually agreed-upon sectors of the Egyptian economy”.
A public-private partnership (PPP) is essentially a means of encouraging the 
outsourcing of previously state-run utilities and services to private companies. 
Under this arrangement, the private company signs a contract with the 
government to provide certain services, such as running a hospital or a power 
plant. In return, the company receives payments from the government, or from 
the direct users of the service. This is, in effect, privatisation under a public-
relations cover.
Investment by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 
the Middle East has traditionally been explicitly linked to PPPs. The EBRD was set 
up to help East European countries transition quickly to capitalist economies. A 
hallmark of such transitions was huge and rapid privatisation programs.
 
Already, the EBRD is contemplating providing 1 billion Euros a year to Egypt 
starting in 2012. This will be the first time that the EBRD has extended its program 
to the Middle East, and the yearly massive sum that it has announced would lead 
undoubtedly to an accelerated process of privatisation in Egypt. At the Annual 
General Meeting of the EBRD in late May, Egyptian representatives obligingly 
signalled their intention to “encourage PPP initiatives”.
Concluding Remarks 
It appears evident that current as well as promised commitments of financial 
assistance and investment from Western powers and IFIs are premised on Egypt’s 
adoption of an ambitious program of economic liberalisation. This program will 
entail deepening privatisation (mainly in the form of PPPs), deregulation (initially 
linked to more foreign investment) and reduction of trade barriers (in return for 
greater access to US and European markets).
Such a neoliberal project is likely to lead to rapid expansion of Egypt’s already 
heavy external debt burden, which will put increasing pressure on the country 
to adopt a long series of restrictive structural adjustment programs. Meanwhile, 
the business and military elites that continue to dominate the country are the 
likeliest social strata to profit while the living standards of the vast majority of 
Egyptians will surely face continuous erosion.
Was this the kind of future that galvanised in early 2011 the massive and 
unprecedented social uprising in Egypt that toppled Mubarak from power?
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Egypt’s Total External Debt (in US$ billions)
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